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McCall: Lydia v. Horton: You No Longer Have to Protect Me from Myself

You No

LYDIA V. HORTON:
LONGER HAVE TO PROTECT
ME FROM MYSELF

I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent decision of Lydia v. Horton,' the Supreme Court of South Carolina
recognized that the right to sue is not unlimited. Mitchell Lydia brought suit against
was
Steve Horton after Horton allowed Lydia to drive Horton's car while Lydia
2
the
At
a
quadriplegic.
intoxicated. A subsequent single-car accident left Lydia
firsta
beginning of this suit the question of whether South Carolina recognizes
party negligent entrustment cause of action was an issue of first impression
Although the court has addressed other similar issues, this case was the first time
the court had to determine if an injured party could bring a lawsuit against a person
who placed the instrument in the injured party's hands. The Supreme Court of
South Carolina properly refused to protect voluntarily intoxicated drivers from
themselves by holding that Lydia could not recover on a first-party negligent
4
entrustment cause of action.
This Note examines the first-party negligent entrustment cause of action and the
possible ramifications of the Lydia decision. Part II explores the history and
development of the tort of negligent entrustment and distinguishes between firstand third-party actions. Part III provides an in-depth discussion of the decision in
Lydia, as well as the authorities used by the court of appeals and the supreme court
to reach their decisions. Part III also addresses the public policy basis for Lydia.
Finally, Part IV discusses the future ramifications of the Lydia decision.
II. HISTORY OF THE NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT DOCTRINE
A.

Development of the Doctrine

The doctrine of negligent entrustment can be traced back to the 1816 English
case of Dixon v. Bell.' In Dixon, Bell instructed a ten-year-old girl, who was his
servant, to fetch his loaded gun. Dixon's son was injured when the girl tampered

1. 355 S.C. 36, 583 S.E.2d 750 (2003).
2. Id. at 37, 583 S.E.2d at 751.
3. Id. at 38, 583 S.E.2d at 751. South Carolina has long recognized third-party negligent entrustment claims. See, e.g., Howell v. Hairston, 261 S.C. 292, 301, 199 S.E.2d 766, 770 (1973) (holding
parents could be liable to a third party injured by an air rifle that the parents negligently entrusted to

their son).
4. See Lydia, 355 S.C. at 43, 583 S.E.2d at 754.
5. 105 Eng. Rep. 1023 (K.B. 1816).
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with the trigger and caused the gun to discharge. 6 The court imposed liability on
the master, who owned the gun, because he knew of his servant's incompetency, yet
entrusted her with a dangerous weapon. 7 "Dixon was one of the first cases which
recognized that an owner who supplies a chattel to a child or someone likely to
harm himself or another is liable to the injured person. ' In the 1920s, courts began
to extend the "negligent entrustment doctrine from bailment of guns to bailment of
automobiles." 9 For example, in Anderson v. Daniel,0 a father who allowed his
sixteen-year-old son to drive his car was held liable for the injuries to a third person
that resulted from his son's accident." The expansion of the doctrine was easy to
explain because the entrustee was a minor. "As more cases developed, the close
relationships such as master/servant or parent/child were not always required."' 2
In the late 1920s and early 1930s, courts began to impose liability on owners
for entrusting their cars to incompetent, inexperienced, or habitual drunk drivers.' 3
After many of these cases, the drafters of the Restatement (First) of Torts decided
to include a section describing the law of negligent entrustment. 4 In 1965, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (which is still current today) adopted the negligent
entrustment section with virtually no change from the First Restatement.' 5 Once a
cause of action was recognized, courts throughout the United States began to
6
expand the doctrine of negligent entrustment.1
B. Negligent Entrustment in South Carolina
In South Carolina, the tort of negligent entrustment is rooted in the case of
Howell v. Hairston.7 Howell stated that liability for injuries inflicted by a minor
with a gun may be predicated on the fact that the parents permitted the minor to
have the gun knowing the minor was of a reckless or malignant disposition.'
Under the theory of negligent entrustment, South Carolina has recognized that "the
owner or one in control of the vehicle and responsible for its use who is negligent

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Daniel S. Whitebook, Note, Who's Driving, Anyway?: The Status of Negligent Entrustment
in FloridaAfter Home v. Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc., 12 NOVA L. REV. 939, 951 (1998).
9. Id.
10. 101 So. 498 (Miss. 1924).
11. Id. at 499-500.
12. Whitebook, supra note 8, at 951.

13. See, e.g., Greeley v. Cunningham, 165 A. 678, 679 (Conn. 1933) (imposing liability on an
automobile owner who entrusted his car to a lady who was incompetent, inexperienced, and a reckless
driver); Crowell v. Duncan, 134 S.E. 576, 577 (Va. 1926) (involving an adult son known to the father
to have a habit of getting under the influence of intoxicants).
14. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 390 (1934).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 (1965).
16. See Whitebook, supra note 8, at 952.

17. 261 S.C. 292, 199 S.E.2d 766 (1973).
18. Id. at 298, 199 S.E.2d at 769.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss3/19
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9
in entrusting it to another can be held liable for such negligent entrustment."'
There are several cases that discuss claims for negligent entrustment where the
claim is based on the driver's alleged impairment due to alcohol use. These cases
consistently define the elements of this cause of action as:

(1) Knowledge of or knowledge imputable to the owner that the
driver was either addicted to intoxicants or had the habit of
drinking, (2) that the owner knew or had imputable knowledge
that the driver was likely to drive while intoxicated, and (3) under
these circumstances, the entrustment of a vehicle by the owner to
such a driver.20
C. DistinctionBetween First-Partyand Third-PartyPlaintiffs

Before Lydia v. Horton,2' South Carolina courts had never addressed whether
an entrustee could sue an entrustor for negligent entrustment where the plaintiff s
impairment is the cause of his own injuries. A third-party claim differs from a firstparty claim in that a third-party claim is based on forseeability. In first-party claims,
where one places himself in harms way, forseeability is outweighed by the fact that
the plaintiff is responsible for his own actions. Even though the court barred
Lydia's first-party claim, the negligent entrustment cause of action is still available
to third parties, who are the intended beneficiaries of this theory. 22 The negligent

entrustment doctrine "is founded in23tort-the negligence of the owner in turning the
incompetent loose on the public.,
In Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc. ,24 a dram shop action, the Supreme Court of
South Carolina established the legal principle that a court will protect the general
public, but not the one who drinks alcoholic beverages, from the consequences of
his own intoxication.25

19. Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Passmore, 275 S.C. 618, 621,274 S.E.2d 416,418 (1981) (citations

omitted).
20. Lydia v. Horton, 343 S.C. 376,381,540 S.E.2d 102, 105 (Ct. App. 2000); see, e.g., Am. Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 275 S.C. at 621,274 S.E.2d at 418 (reversing the trial court's finding of liability because
defendant lacked ownership and control of the car); Jackson v. Price, 288 S.C. 377, 382, 342 S.E.2d
628, 631 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding the entrustor liable because he knew that the entrustee had been
drinking and still permitted him to drive); McCallister v. Graham, 287 S.C. 455,458,339 S.E.2d 154,
156 (Ct. App. 1986) (rejecting the plaintiff's claim of negligent entrustment because the record lacks
evidence of the required knowledge to meet the test of liability).
21. 355 S.C. 36, 583 S.E.2d 750 (2003).
22. Id. at 42, 583 S.E.2d at 754.
23. Rodgers v. McFarland, 402 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. Ct. App. 1966).
24. 332 S.C. 90, 504 S.E.2d 318 (1998).
25. Id. at 92, 504 S.E.2d at 319-20.
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Imposing liability on a tavern owner for continuing to serve an
intoxicated person who later injures others serves public policy by
imposing upon the tavern owner a duty to use judgment and
discretion. [The court does] not believe that the owner will
exercise this judgment and discretion less prudently if he risks a
law suit only when the intoxicated person injures others.26
This rationale applies to vehicle owners just as it does to tavern owners.
III. THE DECISION IN LYDIA V.HORTON
A.

Facts

Steve Horton owned a 1973 Volkswagen automobile.27 On April 27, 1995,
Mitchell Lydia became intoxicated and was incompetent to operate a vehicle.2" The
complaint alleged that Horton either knew or should have known that Lydia was
incompetent to operate the automobile, yet Horton entrusted its operation to him.29
In his intoxicated condition, Lydia then drove Horton's car, lost control, and struck
a tree. The collision rendered Lydia a quadriplegic.30
B. ProceduralHistory in Lydia v. Horton
Lydia brought a first-party negligent entrustment action against Horton. 3 In
ruling on Horton's motion for summary judgment, the trial court concluded, as a
matter of law, that Lydia's negligence exceeded that of Horton and granted
Horton's motion.32 The South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
"entrustee may bring a first party cause of action for negligent entrustment against
the entrustor of the vehicle., 33 The court of appeals held that Lydia's action was
subject to the traditional defenses available in negligence claims.34 Thus, if the
plaintiff were negligent, his recovery would be reduced by the percentage of his
negligence.35 However, recovery would not be barred unless the plaintiffs
negligence exceeded that of the defendant.36 The Supreme Court of South Carolina
reversed the court of appeals decision and held that an intoxicated adult may not

26. Id. at 92, 504 S.E.2d at 320.
27. Lydia v. Horton, 343 S.C. 376, 379, 540 S.E.2d 102, 104 (Ct. App. 2000).

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Lydia v. Horton, 343 S.C. 376, 395, 540 S.E.2d 102, 113 (Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 395-96, 540 S.E.2d at 113.
See id. at 394-96, 540 S.E.2d at 112-13.

36. Id. at 394, 395-96, 540 S.E.2d at 112.
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recover on a first-party negligent entrustment action.37
C. Basis of Court ofAppeals Decision
The court of appeals adopted the "Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 308
and 390 as the appropriate standard for negligent entrustment. ' '38 Section 308,
entitled "Permitting Improper Persons to Use Things or Engage in Activities,"
applies when an entrustor permits an entrustee to use something "under the
[entrustor's] control., 39 In order for the entrustment to be "negligent," the plaintiff
must show that the entrustor either knew or should have known that the entrustee
would use the thing in a way likely to harm others.' Comment b of section 308
indicates that this cause of action is most frequently used when the entrustee is in
a class such as young children or feeble-minded adults." However, section 308 also
applies where the entrustee is not in such a class if the entrustor has reason to
believe he or she will misuse the thing entrusted.4 2
Section 390 is entitled "Chattel for Use by Person Known to be Incompetent. 43
By its terms it applies only to an incompetent entrustee, defined as one "whom the
supplier [of a chattel] knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his
youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk
of physical harm to himself and others."" Section 390, therefore, is a special
application of the rule stated in section 308."5 Section 308 broadly defines a
negligent act, while section 390 explains the possible liability for the negligent act.
The court of appeals read these two sections of the Restatement as extending the
entrustor's liability to the injured incompetent entrustee, Lydia.
The court acknowledged that many South Carolina cases closely follow the
logic of the Restatement.' The court of appeals further discussed several cases
from other jurisdictions that rely in some manner upon the Restatement (Second)
of Torts sections 308 and 390 in allowing a first-party cause of action for negligent
entrustment.47 In particular, the court adopted the following language from the
Supreme Court of Colorado:
37. Lydia v. Horton, 355 S.C. 36,43, 583 S.E.2d 750, 754 (2003).
38. Lydia v. Horton, 343 S.C. 376, 385, 540 S.E.2d 102, 107 (Ct. App. 2000).

39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
40. Id.
41. Id. § 308 cmt. b.

OF TORTS

§ 308 (1965).

42. Id.

43. Id. § 390.
44. Id.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 cmt. b (1965).
46. See Howell v. Hairston, 261 S.C. 292,296, 199 S.E.2d 766,767-68 (1973); Jackson v. Price,

288 S.C. 377, 382, 342 S.E.2d 628, 631 (Ct. App. 1986); McCallister v. Graham 287 S.C. 455,458,
339 S.E.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1986).
47. Lydia v. Horton, 343 S.C. 376,388-90,540 S.E.2d 102, 109-10 (Ct. App. 2000); see Keller
v. Kiedinger, 389 So.2d 129, 132 (Ala. 1980); Meachun v. Faw, 436 S.E.2d 141,144 (N.C. Ct. App.

1993).
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[S]ection 390 provides a basis for resolving the issues of duty
(whether a supplier of a chattel owes any obligation to a person
incurring physical harm from the use of the chattel by the person
to whom it is supplied) and the specific standard of care (the
criteria for assessing reasonable care in light of apparent risk) in
the context of supplying chattels for the use of others.48
Comment c of section 390 notes that an individual "who accepts and uses a
chattel knowing that he is incompetent to use it safely... [will usually be in] such
contributory fault as to bar recovery."49 However, the comment further states that
if the person is in a class that is "recognized as [being] so incompetent" as not to be
"responsible for their actions," then the supplier may be liable for that person's
injuries.5 0 Also, if the supplier knows that the person's condition makes him
incapable of exercising reasonable care, then the supplier may be responsible for
self-inflicted harm.5
The court of appeals found that section 390 of the
Restatement establishes a framework for examining whether Horton owed Lydia a
52
duty.
The court of appeals acknowledged the decision in Tobias v. Sports Club,
Inc.," but distinguished it from Lydia because Tobias did not involve negligent
entrustment.5 4 The court of appeals justified its decision on the ground that
negligent entrustment of a dangerous instrumentality is different from furnishing
alcohol in violation of a statute.5"
Jurisdictions throughout the country have recognized a first-party negligent
entrustment cause of action. One particularly instructive case is Keller v.
Kiedinger.56 In an action against the entrustor of an automobile by the father of the
entrustee-a fourteen-year-old girl who died in a one-car accident caused by her
own negligence-the Supreme Court of Alabama concluded that a bailee can
maintain a cause of action against a bailor." The Keller court stated that negligence
on the part of the daughter was "not a necessary element of negligent entrustment";
rather, the entrustor's liability rested solely on his own negligence.5 8 However, in
accordance with section 390, comment c, the court found that the daughter was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law and that the plaintiff s action was

48. Casebolt v. Cowan, 829 P.2d 352, 358 (Colo. 1992).
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 cmt. c (1965).
50. Id.

51. Id.
52. See Lydia, 343 S.C. at 376, 540 S.E.2d at 111.

53. 332 S.C. 90, 93, 504 S.E.2d 318, 320 (1998) (holding no first party cause of action is available to an intoxicated adult against a tavern owner under alcohol control statutes).
54. Lydia, 343 S.C. at 386, 540 S.E.2d at 108.

55. Id.
56. 389 So.2d 129 (Ala. 1980).
57. Id. at 130-32.
58. Id. at 132.
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barred.59
In Meachum v. Faw,6 ° the owner of the car entrusted his vehicle to an
unlicensed sixteen-year-old girl who had consumed substantial amounts of mind6
altering substances, leading to a wreck that resulted in her death. ' Like the Keller
court, in Meachum the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a bailee may
bring an action for negligent entrustment against the bailor, but that such an action
62
may be defeated by the bailee's contributory negligence. As a matter of law, the
court determined that the plaintiffs claim was barred by the girl's contributory
negligence.6 3
The courts in both Keller andMeachum held the entrustee had a cause of action
against the entrustor, but that the entrustees were unable to recover because of their
contributory negligence. In Lydia, the court of appeals pointed out that in states
negligence, a first-party negligent entrustment claim is a
recognizing contributory
"self-defeating claim."'' However, the court of appeals determined that those states
following the comparative negligence rule, such as South Carolina, "seem to
uniformly accept such a cause of action [being] brought by his injured entrustee
against an entrustor. ''6
The court of appeals in Lydia examined several cases in comparative
66
negligence jurisdictions that allow first-party causes of action by entrustees. For
67 the plaintiff-entrustee was seriously injured in an
example, in Blake v. Moore,
68
accident caused by his intoxicated operation of the defendant-entrustor's car. The
California Court of Appeals held that the entrustee was entitled to a comparative
fault trial that would "result in a weighing of defendant's fault in entrusting his car
to plaintiff with knowledge of the intoxication, and the fault of plaintiff in drinking
7
and then driving. ' 69 Relying on Blake, the court in Gorday v. Faris applied the
7
doctrine of negligent entrustment when the injured party was the entrustee. " The
case involved an accident where an intoxicated owner-passenger entrusted his car
to his intoxicated friend.72 The Florida court concluded, "We are persuaded, in
view of the existence of the comparative negligence rule in Florida, that the liability
for negligent entrustment under the circumstances . . . in this case must be
59. Id. at 133.
60. 436 S.E.2d 141 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).

61.
62.
63.
64.
Petefish,
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 145.
Id.
Lydia v. Horton, 343 S.C. 376, 392, 540 S.E.2d 102, 111 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting King v.
541 N.E.2d 847, 852 (111. App. Ct. 1989)).
Id.
Id. at 393, 540 S.E.2d at 111.
208 Cal. Rptr. 703 (Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 704.
Id. at 708.
523 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 1218.
Id. at 1216.
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determined by the trier of fact after a comparative fault trial." 3
In Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co.,"' the Supreme Court of South Carolina
determined that South Carolina should adopt a comparative negligence scheme
rather than the existing contributory negligence system. 75 "For all causes of action
arising on or after July 1, 1991, a plaintiff in a negligence action may recover
76
damages if his or her negligence is not greater than that of the defendant.
Because South Carolina follows the comparative negligence rule, the court of
appeals in Lydia determined that the fact finder should compare the plaintiffs
negligence with that of the defendant." Thus, the case was reversed and remanded
for trial.78
D. Basis of Supreme Court Decision
While South Carolina has recognized the common law tort of negligent
entrustment, its decisions have not been based on the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. The supreme court pointed out that only one of the seven illustrations
provided in section 390 of the Restatement "refers to a first party claim, and [the
court did] not believe that a pure first party claim can be extrapolated from the
illustration. The example involves a lessee/lessor relationship where a third-party
is injured, which is not analogous to the facts of this case."79 Thus, the supreme

court rejected the court of appeals' adoption of sections 308 and 390 of the
Restatement.8 °
South Carolina's modified comparative negligence system dictates that a
plaintiffbe barred from recovery ifhis negligence outweighs the defendant's.8 ' The
court in Lydia stated that it "cannot imagine how one could be more than fifty
percent negligent in loaning his car to an intoxicated adult who subsequently injured
himself."82 Lydia admitted that he was unable to control the car and that his
inability caused the accident.8 3 The court agreed with the trial court's finding that
these admissions support the sole legal inference that Lydia's negligence exceeded
Horton's. Although comparative negligence is generally a question for the jury, if
the evidence points to only one conclusion-that the plaintiff's negligence exceeded

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 1219.
303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991).
Id. at 244, 399 S.E.2d at 784.
Id. at 245, 399 S.E.2d at 784 (footnote omitted).
Lydia v. Horton, 343 S.C. 376, 396, 540 S.E.2d 102, 113 (Ct. App. 2000).
Id.
Lydia v. Horton, 355 S.C. 36, 39, 583 S.E.2d 750, 752 (2003) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 43, 583 S.E.2d at 754.
Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 245, 399 S.E.2d 783, 784 (1991).
Lydia, 355 S.C. at 40, 583 S.E.2d at 752.
See Lydia v. Horton, 343 S.C. 376, 395, 540 S.E.2d 102,112 (Ct. App. 2000).
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fifty percent-then a direct verdict is warranted.1 Thus, under South Carolina's
"modified comparative negligence system," Lydia was barred from recovery on a
85
"first party negligent entrustment cause of action."
The supreme court went further to state that "South Carolina's public policy
prohibits a first-party negligent entrustment action" even if"comparative negligence
would not bar [the] claim."86 The supreme court rejected the court of appeals'
creation of a first-party cause of action under the theory of negligent entrustment of
a vehicle to an intoxicated individual, holding it was in conflict with the public
8
policy set forth in Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc." The supreme court stated that "[tlhe
public policy considerations which govern our decision as to whether to allow civil
suits based on negligent entrustment grow out of South Carolina's regulation of the
sale of alcohol."88
In Tobias, 9 the supreme court expressly disallowed a first-party cause of action
against tavern owners for violation of particular dram shop penal statutes, holding
that "public policy is not served by allowing the intoxicated adult patron to maintain
9
a suit for injuries which result from his own conduct." " In Tobias, a motorist and
his wife sued a tavern owner under the dram shop statutes alleging liability for the
91
motorist's injuries sustained in operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The Tobias
court rejected first-party claims against the tavern owners, but preserved the claims
of third parties. 92
The Lydia court found that the public policy evident in Tobias was equally
controlling.93 In South Carolina, intoxicated adults should be held responsible for
their own conduct. Just as Tobias barred recovery against parties who provide
alcoholic beverages, Lydia likewise barred recovery against parties who entrust a
motor vehicle. 94 While third parties may recover from the negligent entrustor, the
plaintiff, a voluntarily intoxicated adult, may not shift the blame for his own injury
to someone else. 95
The supreme court justifiably restricted suit for negligent entrustment to third
parties. The court of appeals' decision, following the precedents of California and

84. Creech v. South Carolina Wildlife & Marine Res. Dep't, 328 S.C. 24, 33, 491 S.E.2d 571,
575 (1997).
85. Lydia, 355 S.C. at 40, 583 S.E.2d at 752.
86. Id. at 41, 583 S.E.2d at 753.
87. Id. at 42, 583 S.E.2d at 754.
88. Id. at 41,583 S.E.2d at 753.
89. Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc., 332 S.C. 90, 504 S.E.2d 318 (1998) (overruling Christiansen v.
Campbell, 285 S.C. 164, 328 S.E.2d 351 (Ct. App. 1985), which held that a bar owner's violation of
the penal statute forbidding service to intoxicated persons could support a civil suit against the bar for
injuries caused by the intoxicated patron).
90. Id. at 92, 504 S.E.2d at 320.
91. Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc., 323 S.C. 345, 347, 474 S.E.2d 450,451 (Ct. App. 1996).
92. Tobias, 332 S.C. at 93, 504 S.E.2d at 320.
93. Lydia v. Horton, 355 S.C. 36, 42, 583 S.E.2d 750, 754 (2003).
94. Id. at 42-43, 583 S.E.2d at 754.
95. Id. at 42, 583 S.E.2d at 754.
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Florida, among other jurisdictions, was misplaced. The supreme court was correct
not to allow South Carolina to join these states in their erosion of the principle of
96
personal accountability.
The supreme court's logic in deciding Lydia is supported by long-standing
precedent. In 1886, the court held that voluntary intoxication is not a defense to
excuse wrongful conduct.97 Also, the state supreme court in Vaughn stated:
[V]oluntary intoxication, where it has not produced permanent
insanity, is never an excuse for or a defense to crime, regardless
of whether the intent involved be general or specific. Reason
requires that a man who voluntarily renders himself intoxicated be
no less responsible for his acts while in such condition. To grant
immunity for crimes committed while the perpetrator is in such a
voluntary state would not only mean that many offenders would
go unpunished but would also transgress the principle of personal
accountability which is the bedrock of all law. "The effect of
drunkenness on the mind and on men's actions... is a fact known
to everyone, and it is as much the duty of men to abstain from
placing themselves in a condition from which such danger to
others is to be apprehended as it is to abstain from firing into a
crowd or doing any other act likely to be attended with dangerous
or fatal consequences.""
Other jurisdictions have followed reasoning similar to that in Vaughn. For
instance, a Florida District Court of Appeal concluded that a plaintiff cannot shield
himself from responsibility for his own negligence with his voluntary intoxication.99
The Maryland Court of Appeals reiterated that "[h]uman beings, drunk or sober, are
responsible for their own torts."" ° The California Court of Appeals reasoned that
"self-police provides the primary defense against the evils of intoxication and
outside police plays only a secondary role."' ' ' Thus, the person with primary
responsibility, the one who voluntarily consumed alcohol, "is not excused... by a

96. See State v. Vaughn, 268 S.C. 119, 126, 232 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1977) (explaining that the
judge erred in basing the jury instructions on the assumption that the rule in South Carolina is that
voluntary intoxication may negate responsibility for certain wrongful actions).
97. State v. Bundy, 24 S.C. 440, 441 (1886).
98. Vaughn, 268 S.C. at 125-26,232 S.E.2d at 330-31 (1977) (quoting 22 C.J.S. CriminalLaw
§ 66 (1961)).
99. Reed v. Black Caesar's Forge Gourmet Rest., Inc., 165 So. 2d 787, 788 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1964) (concluding that "the death of the plaintiff's husband was the result of his own negligence or his

own voluntary act of rendering himself incapable of driving a car rather than the remote act of the
defendant in dispensing liquor, or delivering the ignition keys and possession of the automobile").
100. State v. Hatfield, 78 A.2d 754, 756 (Md. Ct. App. 1951).
101. Kindt v. Kauffman, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603, 606-07 (Ct. App. 1976) (italics removed).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol55/iss3/19

10

LAWHave to Protect Me from Myself
No Longer
2004] McCall: Lydia v. Horton: You TORT

failure of secondary policing."' 2 If our court system were to allow an intoxicated
person to recover for injuries caused by his over-indulgence of alcohol, 0it3would
The
most likely "encourage, rather than discourage, such over-indulgence."'
protecting
paternalism
California Court of Appeals noted that "[g]ovemmental
people from their own conscious folly fosters individual irresponsibility and is
normally to be discouraged. To go yet another step and allow monetary recovery
to one who knowingly becomes intoxicated and thereby injures himself is in our
3 4
view morally indefensible."'" Compensating a victim whose behavior contributed
to the accident violates the idea of individual responsibility and fosters an
entitlement mentality. The Supreme Court of South Carolina was correct in
reinforcing the prudent policy of Tobias--"publicpolicy is not served by allowing
the intoxicated adult patron to maintain a suit for injuries which result from his own
conduct."'0 5

Public policy does not protect an intoxicated adult from the results of his own
intoxication. This principle apparently does not apply to a minor, nor to an
alcoholic who is incapable of self-control. Although South Carolina has not directly
addressed this issue, it might find the reasoning of a California Court of Appeals
decision in a dram shop action persuasive:
Are [w]e not.., concerned with a minor, nor with an alcoholic
who suffers from an irresistible and pathological urge to drink
excessively. Such a person may, in fact, be physically ill and
incapable of self-control ....We are concerned with an adult
plaintiff who became drunk because he desired and intended that
result. "
To allow recovery in favor of one who has voluntarily consumed alcohol and
proceeded to get behind the wheel of a car with full knowledge of its possible or
probable results is contrary to good public policy.

102. Id.

103. Nolan v. Morelli, 226 A.2d 383, 387 (Conn. 1967) (discussing policy considerations in a

purchaser's
dram shop action where the furnisher of alcohol was not held liable for the intoxicated

injuries).
104. Kindt, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 610 (citations omitted).
105. Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc., 332 S.C. 90, 92, 504 S.E.2d 318, 320 (1998). This policy is
consistent with the public policy established by the South Carolina Legislature in enacting a workers'
compensation statute, which bars compensation for injuries sustained by an intoxicated employee. This
is an exception to the general principle that fault has no bearing upon an employee's right to recover
worker's compensation benefits. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-9-60 (Law. Co-op. 1976). See also Spoone
v. Newsome Chevrolet-Buick, 309 S.C. 432,432-33,424 S.E.2d 489,489 (1992) (denying workers'

compensation benefits to an employee whose injuries were proximately caused by intoxication).
106. Kindt, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 608 (citations omitted).
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IV. POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

Primarily, it is the function of the legislature to establish the public policy of
South Carolina. 7 However, in Lydia, the supreme court, not the legislature,
defined South Carolina public policy. Occasionally, the factual events of lawsuits
create an opportunity for courts to establish policy in legal areas where no
legislation exists. Thus, in these situations, it is left to the courts to declare the
public policy of the state.'
Once the court has established a public policy, "it
becomes the law of the state, and is as binding as a legislative enactment."' '
Public policy is often an elusive term to define, and it may vary with the habits
and wants of a people. " 0 The meaning of public policy "has been left loose and
free of definition, in the same manner as fraud."''. In determining the public policy
of a state and its application, the court should consider "the constitution, laws, and
judicial decisions of that state, and as well the applicable principles of the common

law."112
Public policy is defined broadly as "principles and standards regarded by the
legislature or by the courts as being of fundamental concern to the state and the
whole of society."'' 3 The Supreme Court of Ohio characterized public policy as:
[T]he community common sense and common conscience,
extended and applied throughout the state to matters of public
morals, public health, public safety, public welfare, and the like.
It is that general and well-settled public opinion relating to man's
plain, palpable duty to his fellow men, having due regard to all the
circumstances of each particular relation and situation." 4
Public policy is also defined as the public good; it is "that principle of law which
holds that no person can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the
public, or against the public good.""''
In Lydia, the state supreme court decided to enunciate public policy in tort law
sua sponte. Although the court in the past has used public policy decisions to

107. See, e.g., Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 357 (1931) (noting
"[p]rimarily it is for the lawmakers to determine the public policy of the state").
108. See Landgraver v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 280 P.2d 301,302 (Or. 1955) (discussing
the concept of public policy when determining whether charitable organizations should be immune to
tort liability).
109. Id.
110. Steele v. Drummond, 275 U.S. 199, 205 (1927).

111. Id.
112. Twin City Pipe Line Co., 283 U.S. at 357.
113. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1245 (7th ed. 1999).
114. Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Kinney, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (Ohio 1916).
115. Lilly v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 1066, 1079 (1950).
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used
expand individuals' rights," 6 here the court, in a case of first impression,
7 the court
Boone"
public policy to restrict these rights. In contrast, in Boone v. 8
used public policy to broaden an individual's right to recovery." In Boone, a wife
sued her husband to recover for personal injuries she suffered in a car accident
9
while riding in a car driven by her husband." The court explained that had the
parties not been married, the wife would have had a cause of action against her
husband, and it stated that "[i]t is the public policy of our State to provide married
persons with the same legal rights and remedies possessed by unmarried
persons."'2 0 Thus, the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity contravenes
In abolishing this immunity, the court
the public policy of South Carolina.'
established public policy that expanded available liability in tort by providing a
personal injury action against one's own spouse.
Another instance when the court established public policy that expanded tort
22
which
law in South Carolina is Fitzer v. Greater Greenville S.C. YMCA,
23 In this case, Fitzer, a camper at a
immunity.'
charitable
of
abolished the doctrine
YMCA camp, brought a personal injury action against YMCA after he was injured
by another camper.'24 YMCA argued that the doctrine of charitable immunity
barred Fitzer's claim. 2 Although previous cases, such as Lindler v. Columbia
Hospital of Richland County,'26 held that it is against public policy to hold a
concept, and
charitable institution liable, 27 "[p]ublic policy is a dynamic not2static
8 The court cited
today."'
policy
a
valid
necessarily
not
is
past
the
in
valid
is
what
29
Geigerv. Sampson Methodist-EpiscopalChurch ofMinneapolis' for its rationale
in abolishing the doctrine of charitable immunity: "Men and corporations alike are
required to be just before being charitable ....We do not think it would be good
30
public policy to relieve them from liability for torts or negligence."' In Fitzer,the
court established public policy that extended tort litigation in allowing a cause of
action against charitable institutions.
Lydia, which can be construed as an extension of Tobias, appears to be one of
the few times when the court has restricted an expansive tort field based on public
policy grounds. Because of the significance of public policy, Lydia should not be

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See, e.g., Boone v. Boone, 345 S.C. 8, 546 S.E.2d 191 (2001).
Id.
See id. at 10, 546 S.E.2d at 191-92.
Id.
Id. at 14, 546 S.E.2d at 194.
Id. at 15, 546 S.E.2d at 194.

122. 277 S.C. 1,282 S.E.2d 230 (1981).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 4, 282 S.E.2d at 231-32.
Id. at 2, 282 S.E.2d at 230.
Id.
98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914).
Id. at 28, 81 S.E. at 513.
Fitzer,277 S.C. at 3,282 S.E.2d at 231.
219 N.W. 463 (Minn. 1928).
Id. at 465.
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limited to its facts. Public policy requires that if a person's injuries result from
becoming voluntarily intoxicated, the person should be held accountable. It was
first applied to first-party injuries in Tobias, a dram shop action, and subsequently
applied in Lydia, a negligent entrustment action. This policy also could be extended
to other scenarios in which a person is injured as a result of placing himself in
harms way while voluntarily intoxicated.'3 1
In Tobias, Chief Justice Finney clearly stated the public policy of our state.
Undoubtedly, defendants will cite both Lydia and Tobias to urge the trial courts to
enforce greater personal responsibility and dismiss cases in which public policy
prohibits a first-party cause of action.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Lydia, the Supreme Court of South Carolina recognized that certain public
policy considerations may restrict the right to sue. The court held that it is against
state public policy to allow a person to sue someone because the defendant did not
protect the person from himself. The extension of the negligent entrustment
doctrine to first-party causes of action would lead to an unnecessary flood of
litigation.
If the supreme court had denied certiorari, lower courts presumably would
decide future first-party negligent entrustment cases under the law of comparative
negligence, with the jury and its emotions determining the fault between the
intoxicated driver and the car owner. However, by eliminating first-party causes of
action, the supreme court has effectively held that those who voluntarily drink
beyond the point of intoxication and get behind the wheel are, as a matter of law in
every case, at least fifty-one percent at fault.
The court's elimination of first-party actions will encourage personal autonomy
and responsibility rather than dependency and paternalism. Because the rule
established by the court is based on public policy considerations, and because the
rule properly distributes the incentive to control irresponsible drinking between the
entrustor and the entrustee, the Supreme Court of South Carolina properly resolved
the first-party negligent entrustment liability issue.

Kayce H. McCall

131. If this public policy was expanded to other self-inflicted torts not involving voluntary intoxication, such as a claim by someone who spilled hot coffee on himself, it could potentially limit the
scope of South Carolina's comparative fault scheme. However, this discussion is outside the scope of
this Note.
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